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Abstract: The evolution of the web server contents and the emergence of
new kinds of intrusions make necessary the adaptation of the intrusion detec-
tion systems (IDS). Nowadays, the adaptation of the IDS requires manual –
tedious and unreactive – actions from system administrators. In this paper, we
present a self-adaptive intrusion detection system which relies on a set of local
model-based diagnosers. The redundancy of diagnoses is exploited, online, by a
meta-diagnoser to check the consistency of computed partial diagnoses, and to
trigger the adaptation of defective diagnoser models (or signatures) in case of
inconsistency. This system is applied to the intrusion detection from a stream
of HTTP requests. Our results show that our system 1) detects intrusion occur-
rences sensitively and precisely, 2) accurately self-adapts diagnoser model, thus
improving its detection accuracy.
Key-words: intrusion detection, self-adaptive diagnosis, meta-diagnosis, self-
adaptive system, web application intrusion
Système auto-adaptatif de détection d’intrusions
Web
Résumé : L’évolution du contenu des serveurs et l’apparition de nouveaux
types d’attaques rend nécessaire l’adaptation dynamique des systèmes de détection
d’intrusion (IDS). De nos jours, les adaptations des IDS nécessitent des inter-
ventions manuelles – non-réactives et rébarbatives – de la part des adminis-
trateurs du système. Dans ce papier, nous présentons un système de détection
d’intrusions adaptatif qui repose sur un ensemble de diagnostiqueurs locaux. Les
redondances entre les diagnostics sont exploitées par un meta-diagnostiqueur
qui surveille, en ligne, la consistance des diagnostics locaux, et, lorsqu’une in-
consistance est détectée, il déclenche l’adaptation des modèles (des signatures
d’intrusion) utilisés par les diagnostiqueurs incriminés. Ce système est appliqué
à la détection d’intrusions à partir d’un flot de requêtes HTTP. Les résultats
montrent que notre système 1) détecte les intrusions de manière précise et sen-
sible tout au long de la surveillance, et 2) adapte de manière adéquate ses
modèles de diagnostic et améliore ainsi ses performances de détection.
Mots-clés : détection d’intrusion, diagnostic auto-adaptation, meta-diagnostic,
système auto-adaptatif, intrusion web
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1 Introduction
Computerized systems, personal or professional, public or private, are more and
more connected to the world wide web. Since such connections open accesses
to data that the user wishes to protect, there is an increasing interest in access
security issues. In order to avoid malicious accesses to, copies of or modifications
of personal data, intrusion detection systems – IDS – are needed for robustly
and precisely detecting intrusions into the protected system.
We are interested in IDSs that can detect intrusions on Web servers. Such
servers are computer systems that are mostly encountered on the Web [7]. Since
they are accessible by everyone, not surprisingly they are among the most at-
tacked systems. Some of the common techniques used by attackers to com-
promise a website include exploiting a vulnerable Web application running on
the server (by attacking through improperly secured input fields), or exploiting
some vulnerability present in the underlying host operating systems. In 2008
alone, Symantec identifies 12.885 site specific web application vulnerabilities.
According to this recent study, 63% of vulnerabilities affected Web applications
in 2008, an increase from 59% in 2007. Therefore, the development of Web IDSs
appears to be an important concern to respond to the need of global network
security.
On the long term, the continuous accuracy and robustness of an IDS cannot
be ensured in real situations without human assistance. In fact, real situations
are not stable, and a major challenge is the conception of IDSs having the
capacity to adapt themselves (i.e. with as little human assistance as possible)
to their evolving environment. The environment can evolve in three ways: evolution of the Web Server content: new pages and services are added
and removed dynamically. Thus, requests that failed at one time might
be successful later. evolution of the Web Server usage: clients modify their behavior when
using the web server along the time. evolution of the intrusions: new kinds of intrusion frequently emerge.
We are particularly motivated by designing a self-adaptive system to detect
intrusions in Web servers. Considering the evolving environment, the adaptation
of the IDS is required. Current adaptation solutions consist in updating or
rebuilding some signatures (intrusion signatures or normal behavior signatures).
But those solutions are tedious and unreactive because they are mostly manual.
Updating a signature base requires an expert who has to perform a boring work
to select the signatures that are suitable for his own server configuration and
content. Similarly, rebuilding requires a tedious selection of significant trace
from which the signatures are rebuilt. In both cases, a human interaction is
required and the IDS will not be fully functional until it has been updated or
rebuilt. In contrast, we would like to devise a self-adaptive Web IDS that could
trigger it own adaptation without human assistance.
This situation is known as an on-line adaptation task in presence of “con-
cept drift” [14] and is reputed to be difficult. The design of self-adaptive IDS
raises two main issues: (1) the autonomous detection and the diagnosis of the
adaptation requirement, and (2) the effective adaptation of the system.
INRIA
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We design a multi-diagnoser architecture, associated to a meta-diagnoser,
that uses integrity constraints to decide when adaptation is required and which
diagnoser should adapt. In a multi-diagnoser approach, each diagnoser agent
constructs its own diagnosis from subsets of features extracted from the obser-
vations. As they are ground on different but partially redundant views of the
system, these diagnoses are supposed to satisfy integrity constraints. When is
not the case, i.e. some of the diagnoses are contradictory, the meta-diagnoser,
according to a consensus principle, detects that the observed system has evolved.
In a first section, we present the issue of the diagnosis of an evolving system.
The Section 2 is dedicated to the state of the art of the intrusion detection from
HTTP requests. Then, in Section 3, we give an self-adaptive diagnosis frame-
work of the system and in Section 4, we present our self-adaptive multi-diagnoser
intrusion detection system. Finally, in Section 5, we give some experiments and
results.
2 Detecting intrusions from HTTP requests
We are interested in an IDS that can detect intrusions on Web servers. More
precisely, we would like to detect intrusions from HTTP requests that are sub-
mitted to the Web server. Deployed network IDSs (e.g. Snort) have the ca-
pability to detect intrusions by analyzing the traffic of TCP/IP packets. As
a consequence, intruders attack the upper OSI layers, e.g. the application OSI
layer. Thus, IDSs dedicated to specific applications seem more relevant to tackle
the complexity of these attacks from the TCP/IP packet point of view. For in-
stance, it is easier to detect a breach in a cgi script from the request than from
the TCP/IP traffic. One of the main challenge is to protect the web server
from known intrusions as well as unknown intrusions while avoiding any tedious
update by the administrators.
In this section, firstly we introduce the structure of access logs, then we
present some known intrusions using HTTP requests and finally we briefly
present the general idea of HTTP request intrusion detection.
2.1 Access logs
All the requests received by the server are recorded in the web server access log
thus a Web IDS can use the access log to detect intrusions. A log is composed
of a list of lines. Each line corresponds to a request submitted to the server
and is a rich structured source of information. It has several fields that describe
the request and the response made by the server to this request. Figure 1
illustrates the overall structure of a log line provided by an Apache server
(Combined format). The main fields are: IP: the IP address of the client (remote host) who has sent the request
to the server. The IP address reported here is not necessarily the address
of the machine at which the user is sitting. If there exists a proxy server
between the user and the server, this address will be the address of the
proxy, rather than the address of the source machine. Time: the time at which the server finished processing the request.
RR n° 6989
6 Guyet & al. Request: the request line from the client is given in double quotes. The
request line contains many useful pieces of information. First, it contains
the method used by the client (e.g. GET, POST, . . . ). Second, it contains
the requested resources (including the potential scripts parameters), and
third, it contains the protocol used by the client (e.g. HTTP/1.0). Status code: the status code that the server sent back to the client. It
indicates the kind of response the server made to the request. For example,
codes beginning with 2 indicate a successful response, codes beginning
with 4 indicate an error caused by the client, . . . The full list of possible
status codes can be found in the HTTP specification (RFC2616 section
10). Size: this field gives the size of the object returned to the client. Referrer: this field gives the site that the client reports having been
referred from (“-” if not available). User agent: The User-Agent is the identifying information that the client
browser reports about itself. Especially, this field can be used to identify
the robots.
Figure 1: Apache log line examples. The session of IP 69.12.60.15 contains 2
requests.
A client session can be rebuilt from log lines by collecting the set of requests
submitted by a same client (identified by his IP) to the server in a limited time
window. The reconstructed session does not necessarily represent the complete
client activity [16] as cache mechanisms may hide some requests. But in order
to detect intrusions, the most interesting requests are those that are submitted
to the server. Nonetheless, a proxy may hide an intruder behind a shared IP.
We will use sessions as an alternative point of view on the current request.
2.2 Intrusion using HTTP requests
A Web server can be intruded by an attacker who sends a suitable HTTP request
or a suitable succession of HTTP requests. Firstly, we give some simple HTTP
request attacks, then we present some attacks using several requests.
Some simple attacks make use of scripts for unauthorized access to protected
information such as: passwords (e.g. .htaccess file), database (e.g. data insertion), information about the local area network (e.g. request to system com-
mands or access to log files),
INRIA
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192.168.0.0 - - [13/Jan/2006:01:07:21 -0200] "GET /awstats/
awstats.pl?configdir=|echo;echo%20YYY;cd%20%2ftmp%3bwget
...;echo%20YYY;echo|HTTP/1.0" 404 291
192.168.0.0 - - [14/Jan/2006:01:01:25 -0200] "GET /cgi-bin/
awstats.pl?configdir=|echo;echo%20YYY;cd%20%2ftmp%3bwget
...;echo%20YYY;echo|HTTP/1.0" 200 291
192.168.0.1 - - [12/Apr/2006:08:05:46 -0300] "GET /rpc/..%%35%63
..%%35%63..%%35%63..%%35%63/winnt/system32/cmd.exe?/c+dir+
c:\\+/OG HTTP/1.0" 400 294
192.168.0.1 - - [12/Apr/2006:08:05:47 -0300] "GET /cgi-bin/%2E
%2E%2F%2E%2E%2F%2E%2E%%4E%4E%54%2F%73%79%73%74%65%6D%33%32
%2Fping.exe%20127.0.0.1
192.168.0.1 - - [12/Apr/2006:08:05:43 -0300] "GET /cgi-bin/
mrtg.cgi?cfg=/../../../../../../winnt/win.ini HTTP/1.0"
404 289
192.168.0.2 - - [12/Apr/2006:08:05:43 -0300] "GET /cgi-bin/
mrtg.cgi?cfg=/../../../../../../etc/passwd HTTP/1.0"
404 289
Figure 2: Intrusion examples. Intrusions from IP 192.168.0.0 are based on
the awstat script, intrusions from IP 192.168.0.1 try to illegally execute system
commands and intrusions from IP 192.168.0.2 try to access to passwords. information about the company activities (e.g. unauthorized browse of
directories).
Another common intrusion is the SQL injection where the intruder attempts
to corrupt a SQL database. In such case, the intruder attempts to execute some
SQL commands like select, where or from using the HTTP request. The same
applies to attempts to execute system commands like cat, grep, wget, dir, ls,
etc. Specific characters like spaces, new lines or null terminators are widely used
(and necessary) on most attempts to execute commands. To detect intrusion, it
is interesting to look for these specific characters, but intruders often hide those
characters using encoded URLs. In an encoded URL, the specific characters are
encoded using hexadecimal codes, e.g. ’%20’ encodes a space (cf. Figure 2).
Figure 2 illustrates some awstats attacks. We see some common system
commands, separators and some encoded characters in the URL. Looking at
the HTTP result code, we know that one was successfull and the other was not
(error 404 and 200).
Some complex intrusions require several HTTP requests. In their security
threat report [9], Symantec noticed increasing of complexity and sophistication
of attacks. “while a single high-security flaw can be exploited to fully compro-
mise a user, attackers are now frequently stringing together multiple exploits
for medium vulnerabilities to acheive the same goal”. For example, a category
of attacks consists in using a software security hole to install malicious software
that will generate unauthorized traffic on the server. Another example – and
the best known attack of web servers – is the DoS attack which consists in
overflooding a server with malicious requests or with requests that generate an
internal error. A DoS attack provokes a system failure where the server is no
RR n° 6989
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more able to respond to non-intrusive requests. In such cases, the analysis of
only one request may not be sufficient to detect an attack and the analysis of a
session may be required.
2.3 Intrusion Detection Systems analyzing HTTP requests
The techniques for intrusion detection fall into two major categories: signature-
based detection and anomaly-based detection. Signature-based detection (e.g. Snort
[20], ModSecurity [19]) identifies malicious behavior by matching a behavior pro-
file against pre-defined descriptions of attacks. Anomaly detection [8], on the
other hand, defines a profile of a subject’s normal behavior and attempts to
identify any unacceptable deviation as the result of a potential attack. The first
category of techniques has good precision and sensibility for known intrusions
but has difficulties to deal with new kinds of intrusions. In fact, a new kind
of intrusion will not be detected, since its own signature is not in the intrusion
signature base. On the other hand, anomaly-based techniques can easily detect
unknown attacks, but their usage generates a lot of false-positive alarms.
Signature-based intrusion detection techniques are widely used for Web server
intrusion detection. The request received by the Web server are successively
compared with the signatures of malicious requests. Consequently, the intru-
sion detection problem stands in the proposition of models (signatures) that
may have the capability to represent robustly and precisely the various intru-
sions that may be encountered. The role of a model is, on the one hand, to focus
on the request features that are relevant for intrusion detection issues and, on
the other hand, to abstract the feature values into the representation.
A wide range of log line models have been already proposed. Tombini et
al. [25]’s anomaly model is a list of pairs linking the accessed ressources and the
combination of parameters that were used, if any. Since web sites are organized
as trees, the global model can be represented by a simple tree structure. If the
requested anomaly detector belongs to the anomaly model, the anomaly detector
checks whether the combination of parameters used is allowed or not. Kruegel
and Vigna [13] introduced an anomaly-based detector of Web-based attacks.
They proposed several intrusion detection models based on request features:
attribute length distribution, attribute character distribution, Markov model of
the structure of the query attributes, attributes order specifications, . . . Ingham
et al. [11] use a deterministic automaton to model the sequence of tokens1.
Bolzoni et al. [4] recently proposed to use regular and irregular expressions
models. Cheng et al. [5] propose to prevent attacks by monitoring the user
behavior with templates modeled by Markov models. In [22, 27], clustering
techniques are used to construct dynamically a model of normal behavior as a
set of clusters based on the character distribution feature.
To the best of our knowledge, no session model has been proposed so far.
Nonetheless, it must be related to the recent interests in alert correlation [6].
Several techniques, especially Bayesian Networks or causal networks, are used
to combine alerts and to recognize intrusion plan [18] or scenarios [17].
1Tokens are semantic units of the URL separated by specific characters (’’, ’ ?’, ’&’)
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2.4 Advanced IDSs
In this paragraph, we review some specificities of advanced IDSs : 1) the com-
bination of diagnoses and 2) the adaptation.
2.4.1 Combining the results of intrusion detectors
It is generally admitted that the combination of several intrusion detectors
(i.e. forming an ensemble of IDSs) can achieve a better performance [2]. The
intrusions can be better detected by combining several pieces of information
that are known to be complementary. Complementary aspects can be observed
along four axes: information that comes from distinct IDSs distributed on the local network information that is gathered from different kind of logs: different OSI lay-
ers (e.g. TCP/IP packets, HTTP logs, . . . ) and/or different applications,
sources (system commands, database, web server, . . . ). information that is extracted from the same source but through different
information filters (e.g. logs attributes), information that comes from systems with different “security policies”
(e.g. Signature-based vs Anomaly-based, or Anomaly detection vs Misuse
detection [25]).
The first two axes use several information sources, while the last two axes
combine the information obtained from only one source but from different points
of view and with the aim to extract as relevant information as possible from
this source.
The first two axes enable the proposition of an architecture to detect and
prevent attacks in local area networks. The main idea is to centralize the in-
formation that comes from several existing tools in order to make the detection
more robust. The system of Tsian et al. [24] merges alarms that comes from sev-
eral network-based IDSs and host-based IDSs deployed on the local network. It
uses the Dempster-Shafer [21] for data fusion. Gu et al. [10] propose a decision-
theoretic alert fusion based on a likelyhood ratio test (LRT). In a global area
network, a collaborative approach [15, 26] to intrusion detection aims at giving
a global view of the network attack activity. Augmenting the information ob-
tained at a single site with information gathered from the network can provide
a more precise model of an intruder’s behavior. For instance, the Worminator
[15] is a P2P collaborative approach to the intrusion detection.
The last two axes are widely used in case of rich and structured data such as
access logs. Since early work on web attack detection [13], it has been noticed
that some access log line attributes are more efficient to detect some attacks
than others. Similarly, some attributes generate more false alarms on some
normal data. A method based on a single attribute would be unable to detect
robustly and accurately all the attacks that can be encountered on web servers,
and it may be fairly easily circumvented by new attacks created by malicious
clients who can hide their intrusions by avoiding the traces they know to be
detectable through some monitored features. To cover a wide range of attacks
and to detect most intrusions, the Web IDS must analyze several attributes and
combine the results of the analysis. For instance, the system of Kruegel and
RR n° 6989
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Vigna [13] computes an anomaly score using by a weighted sum of anomalous
probabilities.
2.4.2 Adapting an IDS
Interaction modes between a client and a web server are highly dynamic. So, the
features of normal and abnormal behaviors may change rapidly necessitating the
adaptation of the monitoring system. Adapting an IDS aims at 1) progressively
improving the detection reliability, and 2) at acquiring the capability to detect
new kind of intrusions. We focus our attention on the discovery of new kinds of
intrusion.
Practically, a Web IDS (e.g. ModSecurity [19]) requires a lot of human ac-
tions, mostly tedious, which restrict the IDS reactivity. To detect new kinds
of intrusion, administrators must update manually the list of intrusion patterns
from signatures elaborated by experts. It appears to be strongly desirable to
automatize (a part or the totality of) the discovery of new kinds of intrusion,
the construction of signatures and the effective update of the IDS.
HoneyComb [12] is a NIDS that facilitates the discovery of new kinds of
intrusion by using HoneyPot. A HoneyPot is a decoy computer resource. Since
there are no entry points for users to interact with these systems, activities on
HoneyPots is considered suspicious by definition. Activities of entities attack-
ing HoneyPots are logged to identify suspicious behaviors and to automatically
extract intrusion signatures.
Another kind of approach aims at adapting the intrusion signatures on-line.
Bojanic et al. [3] propose to use HMM for intrusion detection in system com-
mand sequences. In this method, normal and abnormal (intrusions) behaviors
are modeled by HMMs. If a sequence is suspected as being non probable with
respect to known sequences, additional analyzes are performed. If these new
analyzes tend to show that the sequence does not correspond to an intrusion
then the HMMs linked to normal behavior are updated, else HMMs associated
to intrusions are modified or a new HMM is created. In [23], Srinoy proposes to
use SVM intrusion models associated to a swarm intelligence technique enabling
a dynamic adaptation of intrusion models. Wang et al. [27] are confronted to
the same concept drift issue as us and propose an adaptive Web intrusion detec-
tion system based on outlier detection with the affinity propagation clustering
algorithm and an outlier reservoir that gathers potential intrusion waiting for
further analysis.
3 System overview
A Web server receives a stream of HTTP requests. For each new arriving
request, the adaptive multi-diagnoser system constructs a diagnosis labelling
the request as intrusive or not. If the request is not intrusive, then it will be
processed normally by the server. In parallel a meta-diagnoser observes the
diagnosis process and can trigger the adaptation of the diagnoser based on the
current diagnosed request. Figure 3 illustrates the system architecture.
Our diagnosis approach relies on a multi-diagnoser architecture, i.e. several
diagnoser agents contribute to the global diagnosis. All the diagnosers diag-
nose the same (sub-)problem by different methods and from different features
INRIA
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Figure 3: System overview. The multi-diagnoser architecture consists of 4 diag-
nosers. The decision of the red, “unhappy”, diagnoser is inconsistent with the
decisions of other diagnosers. Consequently, the meta-diagnoser may propose to
adapt this diagnoser. The global diagnosis is used to block the request or not.
extracted from observations taken at different time points or at different loca-
tions. As a consequence, the global diagnosis is elaborated from partial and
redundant diagnosis results.
Considering that no absolute reference is available, a diagnosis mistake is
detected by identifying the inconsistencies between diagnosers. The redundancy
of a set of diagnoses is used by the meta-diagnoser to monitor the need for
adaptation. Our idea is to use the several partially overlapping views of the
system. Due to the fact that views are partially redundant, they must be
consistent on the common parts. If not, it can be concluded that some change
is occurring in some part of the system. For example in the medical domain, at
a particular time the fever severity (high, average or low) of a patient should
be the same though it is computed by different means. If the diagnoses are
not consistent (here, the consistency means fever severity equivalence), it is a
good indication that at least one of the models should be adapted so that the
diagnosers will have a better behavior in the future.
The meta-diagnoser is in charge of analyzing the output of the diagnoser
agents, of detecting some inconsistencies, of locating the diagnosers rising prob-
lems and of proposing actions to improve them by self-adaptation.
4 An adaptive multi-diagnoser system for intru-
sion detection
As mention in Section 2.3, models are important to detect intrusions robustly
and precisely. Moreover, our aim is to provide automatically the models to ad-
ministrators and to avoid handmade models. To this end, we focus our attention
on models that are learned from datasets of labeled log lines.
Each model focuses the diagnoser attention on a specific feature of the log
line. Several features (e.g. request length, character or token distribution, sta-
tus code, etc.) are extracted from observations contained in the log lines at two
RR n° 6989
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abstraction levels, line and session. These features are commonly used for intru-
sion detection [13]. For instance, character or token distribution may be useful
to distinguish malicious requests from normal ones. Some malicious requests
use the URL (especially parameters to scripts) to send intrusion instructions to
the target server. A perceptible change of character distribution could denote
the use of such suspect instructions.
For example, to diagnose the last request of Figure 1, the features would be
the following: character distribution of the URL in the request : ’a’: 1, ’b’: 0,
’c’: 3, ’d’: 1, ’e’: 3, ... token distribution of the URL in the request : ’scripts’: 1, ’access.pl’:
1, ’user’: 1, ’johndoe’: 1 ratio of the errorful status code in the session : error ratio (200):
0.5 character distribution of all the URLs in the session : ’a’: 2, ’b’: 0,
’c’: 6, ’d’: 1, ’e’: 4, ...
A typical character distribution (resp. token distribution) is constructed
from examples as the mean of each character (resp. token distribution) occur-
rences. Note that the feature space dimension is 256 for character distribution,
but is infinite for token distribution. Models based on the ratio of errorful status
code in sessions make use of a Gaussian distribution model and are represented
by the parameters (σ, µ) of the Gaussian.
In this section, we present a proposal for an adaptive web intrusion detection
system. In Section 4.1, we introduce the intrusion detection using model-based
diagnoser agents. Then, in Section 4.2, we explain how the agents diagnoses are
combined. Finally, in Section 4.3, we detail the adaptation layer of the system.
4.1 Model-based diagnoser to detect intrusion
A model-based diagnoser constructs a diagnosis about the current request ac-
cording to its own model. Our definition of diagnosis is inspired by the Dempster-
Shafer (DS) theory of evidence [21]. This choice is justified by the fact that the
diagnosis has to take into account the uncertainty coming from the partial views
that the different agents have on the observed system. To this end, the quanti-
tative representation of a diagnosis and the explicit management of uncertainty
in the DS theory are relevant. Moreover, as a fusion theory, it provides a strong
solution to combine diagnoses as required by our multi-diagnoser architecture.
4.1.1 Diagnosis with Dempster-Shafer theory of evidence
A diagnosis expresses the more or less certainty in any of each status that can be
associated to the current request: normal (N), intrusive (I), or even unknown
(U) e.g. when the uncertainty is too high. This notion of diagnosis is formalized
in the Dempster-Shafer (DS) theory of evidence.
Definition 1 A diagnosis d is a normalized distribution of “masses” on Ω =
{N, I, U}:
d : Ω 7→ [0, 1],
∑
A∈Ω
d(A) = 1
INRIA
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For all A ∈ Ω, d(A) expresses the belief which supports the claim that the
current request is of status A. The preferred candidate in Ω−{U} is called the
diagnosis decision and it is unique.
Definition 2 The diagnosis decision, dd, is the element of {N, I} associated
to the diagnosis d having the maximal belief:
dd = arg max
A∈{N,I}
(d(A))
maxA∈{N,I} (d(A)) gives the belief in the diagnosis decision.
Note that the diagnosis decision cannot be U , but the mass d(U) modifies
the belief in the diagnosis decision: the greater d(U), the more uncertain the
diagnosis.
4.1.2 Model-based diagnosers
A diagnoser is characterized by its model. The model describes the diagnostic
knowledge used by the diagnoser to compute its diagnosis from a subset of the
observations. Each diagnoser has its proper and partial point of view on the
system.
Definition 3 A concrete diagnoser agent (CDA) is characterized by its
mode M where M contains two parts: the submodel of normal requests MN
and the submodel of intrusive requests MI.
In a bootstrap phase, the submodels are learnt from sets of labelled examples
(normal and intrusive requests). The precision p of the model is computed as
the ratio of correct diagnoses on the learning sets.
While diagnosing the log stream, each CDA computes its diagnosis d from
the distance between the current request (R) and the submodels: d(N) = ‖R−
MN‖, d(I) = ‖R−MI‖. The uncertainty mass, d(U), is given by 1− p, where
p is the model precision. Finally, the diagnosis is normalized. The distance
‖. − .‖ depends on the request feature that is used. For character and token
distributions, the model distance to a request is the euclidean distance, and for
the ratio of errorful status code, it is the ratio probability given by the Gaussian
distribution (i.e. Nσ,µ(ratio)).
4.2 Multi-diagnoser architecture
A multi-diagnoser architecture can be seen as a multi-agent system in which
the agents are diagnosers. In order to combine the diagnoses, we introduce
another kind of diagnoser agents, the virtual diagnoser agent (VDA). They aim
at merging the diagnosis of several other agents. As a consequence, the agents
are organized in a hierarchical structure specifying the fusion scheme from the
CDA diagnoses to the global diagnosis of the current request. The agents and
their hierarchical structure compose the multi-diagnoser architecture.
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4.2.1 Virtual diagnoser agent
Definition 4 A virtual diagnoser agent (VDA) Dv is represented by a pair
〈D,⊕〉 where D is the set of diagnoser agents that provide the input diagnoses
to Dv and ⊕ is a combination operator used by Dv to compute its diagnosis.
A VDA constructs a diagnosis by combining diagnoses that have been con-
structed by its related diagnoser agents (concrete or virtual) as defined in D. It is
virtual in the sense that it is not directly related to concrete observation sources.
The combination operator ⊕ defines how to construct the VDA diagnosis from
the diagnoses of the diagnosers of D. In our context, the Dempster-Shafer com-
bination rule is used. For all subset A ∈ Ω, the combination of diagnoses d1 and
d2 is computed by:
d(A) = (d1 ⊕ d2)(A) =
∑
B∩C=A d1(B)d2(C)
1 −
∑
B∩C=∅ d1(B)d2(C)
.
The Dempster-Shafer combination rule is associative, thus the definition can
be easily extended to the combination of more than two diagnoses. Variants of
the Dempster-Shafer combination rule exists [28] and could be used as well.
4.2.2 Multi-diagnoser architecture
Definition 5 A diagnosis combination graph (DCG) is a directed acyclic
graph where nodes represent diagnoser agents and edges specify the communica-
tion flow of diagnoses between agents. Nodes with no descendants, called leaves,
are CDAs and other nodes are VDAs. Among VDAs with no ancestors one is
designated as the root node and represents the global diagnoser.
Definition 6 A multi-diagnoser architecture is represented by a tuple 〈C,V , G, R〉,
where C is a set of CDAs, V is a set of VDAs, G is a DCG, and R is the virtual
diagnoser related to the root of G. The diagnosis computed by R provides the
global diagnosis of the system.
The diagnosis is performed recursively through the DCG: the root VDA
triggers its children for monitoring. If a triggered child is a VDA, it triggers
in turn new diagnosis agents; if a triggered child is a CDA, it computes a new
diagnosis based on its model and the current observations. Once its diagnosis
is computed, a CDA communicates its diagnosis to its ancestor (a VDA) which
will combine all diagnoses sent by its children. Finally, the root VDA combines
the diagnoses collected from its children and compute the global diagnosis.
The combination graph we use to detect Web intrusion (cf. Figure 4) makes
explicit diagnoses based on the session view and diagnoses based on the log
line view: the diagnoses of the Request-CDAs (resp. the Session-CDAs) are
combined by the Request-VDA (resp. the Session-VDA) and the Root-VDA
combines the diagnoses of the Request-VDA and the Session-VDA.
4.3 Adaptive multi-diagnoser system
4.3.1 Integrity constraints
The meta-model used for meta-diagnosis is represented by a set of integrity
constraints that must be satisfied by the diagnoses computed by CDAs and
INRIA
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Figure 4: Diagnosis combination graph (DCG) for HTTP intrusion detection.
Integrity constraints are illustrated by bold red arrows.
VDAs. Integrity constraints express temporal, spatial or structural properties
of the observed system.
Definition 7 An integrity constraint IC on CDAs or VDAs D = {D1, . . . , Dn}
is a tuple 〈D, c, MDCSIC〉 where c is a set of constraints between the diagnoses of the diagnosers in D, MDCSIC ⊂ D is the meta-detection conflicting set, i.e. the set of the
possible sources of integrity violation. D \ MDCSIC is the set of reference diagnosers.
The goal is to distinguish intrusive vs non intrusive sessions, first, and then
to distinguish intrusive vs non intrusive requests. The difficulty is then to be
able to separate intrusive and non intrusive requests inside an intrusive session.
To simplify the problem we assume that every requests in an intrusive session
is intrusive. We are conscious that this assumption is too coarse but it could be
relaxed later by supposing that a session is intrusive if it contains a high ratio
of intrusive requests. Note, however, that this assumption is not directly used
for computing the diagnosis but for determining whether a diagnoser should be
adapted or not. So, to design the meta-model for intrusion detection, we assume
the following property for sessions: every request of a session is of the same type
as the session it belongs to, e.g. if a session is intrusive (I), then all the requests
should be intrusive. This assumed property is exploited by the meta-diagnoser:
when a session predicts an intrusion whereas a request from the same session
predicts a normal behavior an inconsistency should be reported. The converse
situation may also occur.
In the context of Web IDS, the assumed property is exploited to define two
integrity constraints: ICr= and IC
t
=. IC
r
= (resp. IC
t
=) is satisfied if the diagnosis
decision of the Request-VDA (resp. Session-VDA) is the same as the diagnosis
decision of the Root-VDA. If ICr= (resp. IC
t
=) is not satisfied, the MDCS
includes all the Request-CDAs (resp. Session-CDAs). Figure 4 represents these
ICs. The red bold arrows that link an integrity constraint node to diagnosers
node represent the diagnosers involved in the constraint. The red bold arrows
with double arrows identifies the diagnosers of the MDCS. Diagnosers that are
not in the MDCS are reference diagnosers: their diagnoses will not be contested.
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4.3.2 Meta-diagnosis
A meta-detection conflicting set indicates that at least one of its elements is
inconsistent with the others. The next step is to localize which diagnoser is
responsible of this inconsistency and should consequently be adapted.
Definition 8 The meta-diagnosis set (MDSIC) for an integrity constraint
IC is the set of agents to adapt if IC is not satisfied.
In our case, we assume firstly that the fusion performed by VDAs cannot
be responsible of inconsistencies. Thus, the defective diagnosers must be found
among the CDAs. Secondly, we consider that all the leaves that are descendants
of the MDCS nodes involved in a violated integrity constraint can be suspected.
As a consequence, the meta-diagnosis set for an integrity constraint IC is the
set of all the CDAs which are in MDCSIC = {Dc1, . . . , D
c
n} ∪ {D
v
1 , . . . , D
v
m
} or
which are descendants of at least one Dvk ∈ MDCSIC .
In case of inconsistency, the current global diagnosis is computed once and
labelled as uncertain. This label advises the user to not trust the current diag-
nosis until a new trustable one, computed with adapted CDAs, will be provided
in a near future.
4.3.3 Adaptation
The final step to get a fully self-adaptive multi-diagnoser system is to have means
to adapt the defective CDAs from the meta-diagnosis. To this end concrete
diagnoser agents are enriched with adaptation functions.
Definition 9 An adaptive concrete diagnoser agent (ACDA) is repre-
sented by a pair 〈M, fA〉 where M is the model of a CDA and fA is a model
adaptation function.
Definition 10 A reference diagnosis decision ddr is computed by combin-
ing the diagnoses provided by the reference diagnosers of an integrity constraint
IC.
Once, the meta diagnosis has identify the ACDAs to adapt, a reference
diagnosis decision ddr is computed by combining the diagnoses provided by
the reference diagnosers of an integrity constraint IC. For example, the integrity
constraints noted ICr, of the Figure 4, the reference diagnoser is simply the
global diagnosis (constructed by the root-VDA). In this case, there is only one
reference diagnoser, then it is not require to combine several diagnoses.
The reference diagnosis decision ddr related to an unsatisfied IC is pro-
vided to the ACDAs in the MDCSIC for adapting their model. Continuing the
previous example, diagnosis decision is provided to the Request-ACDAs (the
request-VDA can not be adapted). Each agent uses it own adaptation func-
tions with the current request and ddr as parameters. Pratically, if ddr = I
(resp. ddr = N), then the revised submodel MI (resp. MN) is computed by
a weighted averaging of the observed request feature (character distribution,
token distribution, ...) and the old model MI (resp. MN ).
Definition 11 An adaptive multi-diagnoser system is a pair 〈D,MD〉,
where D is a multi-diagnoser architecture whose ACDAs are adaptive and MD
is a meta-model of D.
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In our case, the meta-model MD is a set of integrity constraints.
4.4 Example
Figure 5 illustrates the propagation of diagnoses along the DCG. The process
begins by the computing of the concrete diagnosers of the ACDAs, the results
of which are given at the bottom of the figure. The diagnosis of the VDAs
are computed next by combining the suitable diagnoses applying the Dempster-
Shafer rule. In this example, the two ICs are satisfied because the diagnosis
decision of the Root-VDA and the Request-VDA or the Session-VDA are the
same : they conclude that the diagnosis decision is N and, so, the Root-VDA
reports that the request is normal. Note that the diagnoser DrCD and D
r
Token
disagree, but there is no IC to conclude on the dysfunction of one of them. The
meta-model assumes that it is quite normal to have inconsistent diagnoses at this
level and the inconsistency is solved by using the Dempster-Shafer combination
rule for the fusion of the contradictory diagnoses.
Figure 5: Diagnoses illustration (without adaptation). For each diagnosers,
the 3d vector gives the diagnosis (masses distribution of N, I and U). The bold
number is the highest belief and its position in the vector indicates the diagnosis
decision.
Figure 6 illustrates the case of a diagnosis which leads to an adaptation. We
just changed the diagnosis of the ACDA DrToken. In this case, the Root-VDA
diagnosis decision is I but it is not equal to the Session-VDA diagnosis decision
(N). Then, the integrity constraint ICt= is not satisfied. The consequence will
be the adaptation of the relevant submodels of ACDAs DtCD and D
t
Status.
5 Experiments
The system, called LogAnalyzer2, is fully implemented in C++. The main ob-
jective of the system evaluations is to show that the multi-diagnoser approach
of model adaptation improves the system performances (i.e. precision and sen-
sitivity), on the one hand, and enables the discovery and the effective use of
new kinds of intrusions, on the other hand.
2see http://www.irisa.fr/dream/LogAnalyzer/ for more information.
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Figure 6: Diagnoses illustration (with adaptation). ICt= is unsatisfied, D
t
CD
and DtStatus will be adapted.
5.1 Data and experiments
We collected two large data sets of HTTP access logs on the main Apache server
of two research institutes in July 2007 and June 2008 during 1 month (about
10 million of requests). A preprocessing step consists in filtering out bots and
known non intrusive requests (e.g. requests to static contents: .html, .jpg, .pdf,
. . . ) led to a data reduction. Only 4.66% of the original requests remained in
the logs after filtering. The dataset was also checked to verify that it contained
no intrusion.
For each experiment, 1 million requests, corresponding to several days of
recording on our server, were extracted from the real HTTP log free of in-
trusion. Then, some session, 400 on average, containing 20 intrusive requests
(on average) were introduced at random positions. The intrusive requests were
chosen randomly among 239 known intrusive request examples from the Nikto
intrusion database [1]. Among them, a subset of 203 known intrusive request
examples were manually selected to be used for learning the initial ACDA mod-
els. The other 36 intrusive requests were used for building instances of new
kinds of intrusion that could be encountered during monitoring.
For each request, we compared the global diagnosis decision to the known
status (intrusion or normal) of the request and it were classified among : the false positives (FP) : normal requests that have been diagnosed as
intrusive, the false negatives (FN) : intrusive requests that have been diagnosed as
normal, the true negatives (TN) : normal requests that have been diagnosed suc-
cessfully as normal, or, the true positives (TP) : intrusive requests that have been diagnosed
successfully as intrusive.
We segmented the log in 100 batches of 10.000 requests. For each batch,
we counted the number of FP, TP, FN and TN occurring in the batch, and we
computed the following monitoring performance indicators:
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Diagnosis time Adaptation time
Logline character distribution 31” 2”
Logline tokens distribution 16’11” 6’10”
Session character distribution 42” ǫ
Session error proportion 21” ǫ
Global 23’48”
Table 1: Cumulate time spend by agents (or the system) to diagnose or to adapt
the 1 million requests. epsilon means less than 1 second.
FP FN TP TN DR FPR F-
Measure
With adapta-
tion
2091 530 2018 997831 0.79 0.002 0.61
Without
adaptation
21838 73 2461 978098 0.97 0.022 0.18
Table 2: Performance indicators computed with the diagnoses of the 1 million
requests + 2534 intrusions Detection rate (DR = TP/(TP + FN)), i.e. the accurrately recognized
intrusions. False Positive rate (FPR = FP/(FP + TP + FN + TN)), F-measure (F −Measure = 2 ∗DR ∗P/(DR +P ) where P = V P/(V P +
FP )).
In this way, it is possible to observe the evolution of performance indicators
over time.
In the experiments, we studied the accuracy of adaptations and the improve-
ment of the detection performances by adaptations. The experiments consisted
in comparing diagnosis performances with and without adaptation. Without
adaptation, the diagnoses were computed according to the principle of our multi-
diagnoser architecture but the models of the diagnoser agents, learned from the
training set, do not evolve.
Experiments have been performed using a personal computer (Intel Centrino
Duo T7500). It takes less than 25’ to process the 1 million request and it requires
less than 30 Mo of memory. The table 1 illustrates the computing times we
obtained with a personal computer (Intel Centrino Duo T7500).
5.2 Results
Figure 7 shows the evolution of the performance indicators with and without
adaptation. The Table 2 shows the performance indicators computed with the
entire log. With adaptation, 205565 adaptations occurred. The adaptation ac-
curacy is more than 99%. This means that there are only few cases in which the
adaptation is faulty (e.g. intrusive models are adapted with a normal request).
The main part of the adaptation (202203 occurrences) consists in updating the
normal model with a normal request.
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Figure 7: Evolution of the performance indicators over time. Figures in the left
column: with adaptation, Figures in the left column: without adaptation. The
first two figures (upper), give the evolution of the FP, FN and TP. Figures in
the middle, give the evolution of the detection rate and the false positive rate.
The last two Figures (lower), give the evolution of the F-Measure.
The first two figures show that the adaptation reduces drastically the number
of false positive diagnoses. The number of FP falls down at the very beginning.
This means that the adaptation is quickly efficient, i.e. the system is reactive.
The number of FP does not increase thereafter. On the opposite, the number
of FP stays around 200 per batch (without adaptation it is only about 50 FP
per batch). Nonetheless, the true positive decreases a little while it is constant
without adaptation. We can conclude that the adaptation makes our system
more specific to intrusion: it efficiently reduces the false positive rate, but it
reduces a little the true positives. The number of false negatives are low in the
two cases.
The DR and FPR figures confirm that the detection performances with adap-
tation slowly decreases over time while it is constant without adaptation. The
average of detection rate is 80%. Moreover, we see that the FPR is low, on
average: 0.02 without adaptation and 0.002 with adaptation. Despite the only
four diagnosers, these performances are quite good.
The F-Measure shows the global performances of a diagnoser, it takes into
account both the sensitivity and the precision of the diagnoser to detect the
intrusion. With adaptation, the F-Measure varies around 0.70(+−0.14), while
without adaptation, the F-Measure varies around 0.2(+−0.09). Moreover, we can
see that the global performances of the system with adaptation is relatively
constant despite the decrease of the detection rate. In fact, the number of
intrusion is very low, then the detection rate has only little influence on the
global performances.
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We explain the FPR difference with and without adaptation by the fact
that our evaluation set of intrusions holds some intrusions that are not in the
training set. With adaptation, the system discovers these initially unknown
intrusions and the signatures have been enriched by this knowledge. On the
opposite, without adaptation, the initially unknown intrusions stay unknown
for the system and are not detected (false negatives).
The decrease of the true positive rate can be explained by an overlearning of
normal models. In fact, a lot of adaptation of the normal model are performed
and the models become overfitted. Consequently, some normal requests are less
recognized over the time. In fact, diagnosis is a normalized distribution, if the
normal mass is lower than before while the intrusion mass stays the same, the
intrusion mass may become the biggest.
Based on these experiments, we can conclude that the adaptation improves
reactively the global performances of the multi-diagnoser system and also main-
tains them at a high level. Moreover, our system discovers and detects dynam-
ically new kinds of intrusion.
6 Conclusion
We have presented a system for self-adaptive intrusion detection from a stream
of HTTP requests. Our proposition associates a multi-diagnoser system and a
meta-diagnosis process. Each diagnoser agent constructs its diagnosis according
to its own point of view of the system. Considering that the views are partially
redundant, integrity constraints can be expressed on diagnoses. The meta-
diagnosis process consists in using unsatisfied integrity constraints to trigger
the adaptation of a subset of the diagnoser models.
The results of our experiments concluded that the multi-diagnoser architec-
ture has good computing and performance results. The adaptation improves
reactively the global performances of the multi-diagnoser system and also main-
tains them at a high level. Moreover, our system discovers and detects dynam-
ically new kinds of intrusion. Nonetheless, we noticed that the number of true
positives slowly decreases over time.
It is clear that more sophisticated methods can be used to locate the defective
agents as for instance expert rules or any information on the source of the
detected problem. Other heuristic or informed methods as well as model-based
diagnosis methods (hitting-sets, prime implicants, etc.) could also be adapted
to achieve this task.
We presented a general framework for adaptive intrusion detection system
and its first application in order to prove the validity of our proposal. A first
perspective will be to propose new diagnosers and new hypothesis to construct
alternative diagnosis graph. For instance, it may be based on models learnt on
the long term vs models learnt recently, it may compare the diagnosis from a
two different web servers (with their own signatures) may be compared, etc. We
only used four diagnosers and the computing performances show that several
diagnosers may be added without analyzing time constraints.
A second perspective is to design a more complete IDS solution. We pre-
sented a completely autonomous system: not any manual action is required.
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Nonetheless, in real situations, it is strongly recommended to use the admin-
istrator expertise. For example, administrator may be helpful to correct (not
necessarily frequently) the overlearning of some diagnosers that decreases slowly
the performances of true positives diagnosis. In such a case, our system may be
used 1) as a tool adapting itself reactively to short term evolutions of the web
server environment and 2) as a tool supporting the administrator to adapt the
signatures base on the long term. To support the administrators, our frame-
work based on learnable signatures or models opens an new research direction
in which the system would adapt their models from both their self-adaptation
and interactive suggestion or correction from the administrator.
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